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WHEN FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES AND COMPETITION 
POLICY COLLIDE: RESOLVING THE DILEMMA OF MIXED-
MOTIVE BOYCOTTS 
Kay P. Kindred• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a representative de~ocracy, government must protect the rights of 
its citizens to express ideas, to voice grievances, and to seek to influence gov-
ernment. The First Amendment safeguards these fundamental political rights 
from government intrusion.! In a free market economy, government must 
protect trade and commerce from activities and influences that lead to 
increased concentrations of economic power or that otherwise tend to restrain 
competition.2 The antitrust laws, specifically the Sherman Act,3 seek to safe-
guard the competitive process from restrictive trade practices. Conflict arises 
when efforts to influence government threaten to undermine competition.4 
Nowhere is the clash between First Amendment values and competition 
policy more evident than in the case of economic boycotts undertaken for 
political ends.s This is especially true in the case of boycotts in which the par-
ticipants are motivated by both political and economic concerns, so called 
• Deputy Director, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, and Lecturer-in-Law, College of 
William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. A.B., Duke University, 1977; J.D., 
Columbia University School of Law, 1980. 
1 . "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, ... or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." 
U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2. See'generally, PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANAL.YSIS 47-48 (3d ed. 1981); 
ROBERT H. BORK, '!HE ANTITRUST PARADOX 61-66 (1978). 
3 . "Every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ... 
is ... illegal .... " Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). 
4. See James D. Hurwitz, Abuse of Governmental Process, the First Amendment, and 
the Boundaries ofNoerr, 74 GEO. LJ. 65 (1985). 
5 . The term "boycott" was coined after Captain Charles Cunningham Boycott, the target 
of a protest in Ireland in the late 1800's. Captain Boycott, an estate manager, refused a demand 
by the Irish Land League to reduce rents and initiated eviction proceedings against the tenants of 
the land. The tenants, on advice from Charles Parnell, the leader of the Irish Nationalists, 
refused further dealings with Boycott. '!HE RANDOM HOUSE ENCYCLOPEDIA 1988, at 2507 .(3d 
ed. 1990); WEBSTER THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (UNABRIDGED) 264 (1981). See 
generally St. Paul Fire & Marine, Inc. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 541 (1978). Barry involved a 
class action suit by practicing physicians and their patients against four medical malpractice 
insurers alleging a concerted refusal to deal, in violation of the Sherman Act, by three of the 
companies with the policyholders of the fourth in order to compel compliance with new coverage 
rules. The court stated, "The generic concept of boycott refers to a method of pressuring a party 
with whom one has a dispute by withholding, or enlisting others to withhold, patronage or 
services from the target."); LAWRENCE A. SULLN AN, HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST LAW 229-56 
(1977). 
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"mixed-motive" boycotts. 6 This tension was apparent in the recent case of 
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n (SCTLA).1 In this case, the 
Supreme Court held a boycott of court-appointed representation by a group of 
• private criminal defense lawyers in the District of Columbia to be a per se vio-
lation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act. 
I disagree with the SCTLA decision and will argue that the Court erred 
in its threshold determination that the boycott violated the Sherman Act. I 
begin with the assertion that, in resorting to a per se analysis, the Court 
applied the wrong analytic method. I contend that, despite the economic 
aspects of the SCTLA boycott, there was a sufficient expressive dimension to 
the conduct to warrant a more in-depth analysis than that engaged in by the 
Court. Applying a rule of reason analysis to the SCTLA facts, I conclude that 
the boycott was protected by the First Amendment and assert that, in 
reaching its conclusion to the contrary, the Supreme Court failed to strike an 
adequate balance between constitutional values and antitrust concerns. 
Finally, I propose a new method for balancing First Amendment inter-
ests and competition policy in boycott cases in which political and economic 
interests intersect. Determinations of the validity of First Amendment claims in 
such cases should be based not on appraisals of the primacy of one motive 
over the other, but on the expressive content and political context of the boy-
cott activity. A "totality of the circumstances test" should be substituted for 
the ''motivation test" applied by the SCTIA Court. 
ll. THE COMMERCIAL BOYCOTT/POLITICAL BOYCOTT 
CONTINUUM 
A. The Elusive Distinction Between Political and Commercial Boycotts 
While the boycott concept in its classic sense envisions the concerted 
efforts of competitors at one level to insulate themselves from other competi-
tion,s the term "boycott" encompasses a variety of activities and situations.9 
Nonetheless, boycotts may generally be described as concerted activities 
designed to influence behavior by the i!llposition of economic pressure)O 
Although both use concerted action, there are fundamental differences 
between commercial boycotts and political boycotts. In a commercial boycott, 
6 . This term is derived from Ronald E. Kennedy, Political Boycotts, the Sherman Act, 
and the First Amendment: An Accommadation of Competing Interests, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 
983, 990 (1982) to denote boycotts motivated by a mixture of political and economic concerns. 
See infra text accompanying notes 16-24. 
7. 493 U.S. 411 (1990) [hereinafter cited as SCTIA]. 
8. See generally, SUlliVAN, supra note 5, at 229-32. 
9. See St. Paul Fire & Marine, 438 U.S. at 543 ("[B]oycotts arc not a unitary 
phenomenon") (quoting PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 381 (2nd cd. 1974)). A 
boycott may be the result of an explicit agreement not to deal or it may be a more implicit 
arrangement. For example, through the development of a set of "less than objective" industry 
standards a group of competitors may exclude another competitor by subtle coercion. But 
whether through explicit agreement or indirect coercion, when the purpose and effect is to 
withhold patronage or supplies from a competitor the boycott rule is invoked. See generally 
SULLIVAN, supra noteS, at241-56. 
1 0. Kennedy, supra note 6, at 988. 
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members of the boycotting group use concerted action to protect themselves 
from the competition of nonmembers.ll The objective of the boycott is strictly 
economic: to improve the market power of the participants, and their corre-
sponding profit margins, by forcing unwanted competition from the market.12 
By contrast, the purpose of a political boycott is not to drive out com-
petition, but to advance some noncommercial purpose.13 Political boycotts are 
most frequently used to dramatize grievances or garner public support for a 
cause.l4 The political boycott uses concerted economic pressure to achieve 
social or political, rather than economic, ends.lS Because political boycotts are 
a means of expressing the boycotting groups' political or social views, such 
boycotts directly implicate First Amendment free speech interests that are not 
raised in commercial situations.l6 
All successful boycotts, whether political or commercial, have economic 
consequences (and sometimes economic purposes) that can make distinguish-
ing between them difficult.l7 Some courts and commentators have suggested 
that the distinction be made on the basis of the participants' motive(s) in 
imposing the economic pressure.l8 However, delineating between political and 
commercial boycotts on the basis of the actors' motive cannot provide a 
definitive solution to the problem of categorization.l9 Boycotters may be moti-
vated by a mixture of both political and economic interests.20 For example, a 
convention boycott designed to pressure states to ratify the Equal Rights 
Amendment was motivated by the desire of the participants, a national 
women's rights group, to obtain legislation protecting women's rights to eco-
11. Id. at 985. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., ·384 U.S. 127 (1966) 
Goint activities by automobile manufacturers and certain of its dealers to force other dealers not 
to engage in auto sales through discounters were considered classic conspiracies in violation of 
antitrust laws); Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910) (Court held the combination of 
the stocks of various corporations trading in petroleum and related products in the hands of a 
holding company, with intent to exclude others from the trade, and thus to centralize control of 
the industry, violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act). 
12. Kennedy, supra note 6, at 985. See also, Neil G. Fishman, Note, Commercial 
Entities and Political Boycotts: First Amendment Protections Versus Sherman Act 
Prohibitions, 14 CONN. L. REV. 391, 397 (1982). 
13. Id. 
14. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (the Court 
upheld, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, a boycott by black citizens of Port Gibson, 
Mississippi against white merchants); Missouri v. National Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301, 
1304 n.5 (1980) (in an injunctive action brought by the State of Missouri against the National 
Organization for Women, the court held that NOW's campaign for convention boycotts of states 
which had not ratified the Equal Rights Amendment did not constitute a conspiracy in restraint of 
trade in violation of the antitrust laws). See generally Fishman, supra note 13, at 397. 
15. See Kennedy, supra note 6, at 985; Fishman, supra note 12, at 397. 
16. See Kennedy, supra note 6, at 985. 
17. /d. at 989. 
18. See, e.g., National Org. for Women, 620 F.2d at 1304 n.4; California Motor Transp. 
Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508 (1972) (a civil suit alleging defendant highway carriers 
had conspired against plaintiff highway carriers to put plaintiff out of business by instigation of 
federal and state lawsuits to block plaintiffs application for operating rights and to limit 
plaintiffs access to agencies and courts). See generally Kennedy, supra note 6, at 989; 
Hurwitz, supra note 4. 
19. Kennedy, supra note 6, at 990. 
20. See, e.g., Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 
U.S. 127, 143-44 (1961) (acknowledging the presence of both political and economic 
motivations); California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 508. 
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nomic equality, among other rights.2I Similarly, the closing of gas stations by 
dealers to protest United States Department of Energy regulations on gasoline 
sales was motivated by a general opposition to the government's energy 
restrictions, as well as a desire to lift the price ceiling on gasoline.22 Boycotts 
span the spectrum from the purely commercial to the purely political, with an 
assortment of mixed-motive variants in between.23 
To balance the competing interests of competition policy and First 
Amendment protections, courts have attempted to distinguish between boy-
cotts that are primarily commercial but have "ancillary" political purposes24 
and boycotts that are essentially political but have "ancillary" economic pur-
poses.25 This methodology tends to be highly fact-specific, and is often heavily 
influenced by "the presence or absence of economic gain flowing to the boy-
cotters."26 
B. The Choice Between Per Se and Rule of Reason Analysis 
Traditionally, antitrust law considered group boycotts and other con-
certed refusals to deal to be among the class of horizontal restraints27 held to 
be illegal per se.2s The per se mode of analysis, however, has begun to fall out 
21. National Org. for Women, 620 F.2d at 1301. 
22. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa. 1980), 
rev' don other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980) (in an action by an oil company against its 
retailers, the court held that the concerted action of the retailers in closing gasoline stations for a 
three-day period was designed to express dissatisfaction with government energy policies and 
thus was protected speech immune from antitrust liability). 
23. Kennedy, supra, note 6, at 990. 
24. Id.; see, e.g., California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513-14 (rejecting 
characterization of conduct as political in light of dominant economic motive). See also Allied 
Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 503 (1988) (the Court drew a 
distinction between commercial activity with political impact and political activity with 
commercial impact). 
25. Kennedy, supra, note 6, at 990; see, e.g., Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. 
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135 (1961) (potential economic gain held to be 
incidental to desire to petition the legislature). . 
26. Kennedy, supra note 6, at 990. As will be discussed more fully infra part IV, the 
motive of the participants-whether or not their actions are derived in whole or in part from self-
interests-should at best be but one element weighed in reaching a conclusion as to the nature of 
a particular boycott, and not the controlling factor in an assessment of antitrust liability. 
27. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) ("We 
think that it is clear that the restraint in this case is a horizontal one, and, therefore, a per se 
violation of§ 1 [of the Sherman Act]."). 
2 8. "The per se doctrine labels as illegal any practice to which it applies, regardless of the 
reasons for the practice and without extended inquiry as to its effects." SUU.N AN, supra note 5, 
at 153. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) Goint activities 
by auto manufacturers and certain of its dealers to force other dealers not to engage in discounted 
auto sales were held to violate the Sherman Act); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 
359 U.S. 207 (1959) (the Supreme Court held an agreement between an appliance retailer and 
appliance manufacturers and distributors to sell appliances to a competing retailer only at 
discriminatory prices or under unfavorable terms violated the Sherman Act, notwithstanding that 
the effect of the agreement was not to reduce appliance customers' opportunities to buy in a 
competitive market); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (an 
agreement between afflliated corporations to fix maximum resale prices of their products was 
held violative of the Sherman Act); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) 
(the Court held invalid the practice of members of a women's garment and textile manufacturers' 
association that conditioned sale of its members' textiles to garment manufacturers and its 
women's garments to retailers upon their agreement not to deal in textiles or products copied 
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of vogue, as courts in recent years have evidenced an increasing reluctance to 
expand the application of the per se doctrine and have, in fact, begun to nar-
row its scope-subjecting it to more exacting economic analysis and limiting 
its application primarily to cases involving "classic" anticompetitive boycott 
situations.29 Even in cases in which the coercive nature of the activity is clear, 
courts are growing ever more reluctant to impose per se analysis when the 
economic impact of the restraint is not immediately obvious. Rather, they have 
submitted the restraint to a rule of reason inquiry, evaluating the "competitive 
character'' of the activity.JO In light of the developing momentum against invo-
cation of the "pigeonhole jurisprudence" of per se analysis, any novel expan-
sion of per se analysis warrants a healthy dose of skeptical scrutiny. 
Application of per se methodology is particularly unwise in situations involving 
political boycotts or mixed-motive boycotts in which strong constitutional 
values are in tension with antitrust concerns.Jl The rule of reason approach is 
far better suited for the intelligent resolution of these tensions. 
Under the rule of reason, the test of legality is whether the imposed 
restraint regulates and, thereby, enhances competition, or whether it sup-
presses or destroys competition.32 In one important case, a blanket licensing 
from the designs of association members); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 
(1910) (the Court held the combination of the stocks of various corporations trading in 
petroleum and related products in the hands of a holding company, with intent to exclude others 
from the trade, and thus to centralize control of the industry, violated§§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act). Cf. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (the Court 
upheld as valid an arrangement by a newspaper publisher, owner of the city's only morning 
newspaper and one of its two evening papers, that required purchasers of advertising space in 
the morning paper to also buy the same space at the same unit rate in the evening paper). 
29. See, e.g., FfC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). In Indiana Fed'n 
of Dentists, although not per se illegal, the Court upheld a Federal Trade Commission ruling that 
dentists' refusal to submit x-rays to insurers violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court stated: 
Although this Court has in the past stated that group boycotts are unlawful per se 
... we decline to resolve this case by forcing [this horizontal agreement] into the 
"boycott'' pigeonhole and invoking the per se rule ..•. [1lhe category of restraints 
classed as group boycotts is not to be expanded indiscriminately, and the per se 
approach· has generally been limited to cases in which firms with market power 
boycott suppliers or customers in order to discourage them from doing business 
with a competitor .... 
I d. at 458. See also, Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 
472 U.S. 284, 294 (1985) (holding the expulsion of a member from a cooperative buying 
agency not to be a per se violation of the antitrust laws and stating, "[T]here is more confusion 
about the scope and operation of the per se rule against group boycotts than in reference to any 
other aspect of the per se doctrine .... Some care is therefore necessary in defining the category 
of concerted refusals to deal that mandate per se ·condemnation."); N.C.A.A. v. Board of 
Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 
1 (1979) (blanket licensing for use of copyrighted musical compositions held not to be per se 
illegal price fiXing under the Sherman Act). The Court stated in Broadcast Music, "[l]n 
characterizing ... conduct under the per se rule, our inquiry must focus on ... whether the 
practice facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict 
competition and decrease output, and in what portion of the market .... " 441 U.S. at 19. 
3 0. The rule of reason approach "calls for a broad inquiry into the nature, purpose and 
effect of any challenged arrangement before a decision is made about its legality." SULLIVAN, 
supra note 5, at 153; see, e.g., Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 458-59; Board of 
Regents, 468 U.S. at 104 (1984). 
31. See Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1022. 
32. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1917) (the Court 
found that a rule of the Chicago Board of Trade prohibiting its members from participating in 
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system allowed organizations to operate as clearinghouses for copyright 
owners and users. This organization issued licenses for use of copyrighted 
material that gave licensees the right, for a fee, to perform all compositions 
owned by the organizations' members and affiliates. The operation was so 
efficient that it increased output and thus was procompetitive.33 Similarly, in 
another case, a manufacturer's agreement with its dealers restricted the loca-
tions at which the dealers could sell the manufacturer's product. This system 
actually stimulated interbrand competition and thereby enhanced competition 
in the overall market.34 Therefore, the key to a determination of illegality under 
the rule of reason is the impact on competition. 
Both the per se rule and the rule of reason are used by courts to judge 
the competitive significance of a restraint.JS Restraints "whose nature and 
necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the 
industry is needed to establish their illegality ... are 'illegal per se. "'36 
Restraints "whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the 
facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why 
it was imposed" are subject to the rule of reason.37 A court may conclude that 
a restraint is unreasonable on the basis of the nature of the activity. On the 
other hand, the court may rely on a presumption that, given the surrounding 
circumstances, the activity was intended to restrain trade and increase price. 
Ultimately, the determination is based upon an assessment of the impact of the 
restraint on the competitive market.JS 
Of all coercive activity, none presents a more difficult mix of factors 
analytically than the commercial boycott undertaken to achieve political ends. 
While such a mixed-motive boycott may be inherently coercive and anticom-
petitive, it may also represent a form of political speech that deserves consti-
tutional protection. Perhaps the best example is the NOW boycott case where 
the court discussed this consequence: "NOW's campaign was intended to and 
did in fact injure Missouri in its relationship with its convention customers ... [; 
h]owever, using a boycott in a ... political arena ... is not proscribed by the 
Sherman Act."39 
Further, the constitutional issues aside, some group boycotts may simply 
be a form of "collective bargaining"-a joint refusal to accept a monopsonist40 
price-making for commodities for two or three hours at the end of each business day was not a 
restraint on trade in violation of antitrust laws). 
33. See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 1. 
34. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. G1E Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
35. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1977) 
(the Court held an association of professional engineers' canon of ethics that prohibited its 
members from submitting competitive bids for their services to be a violation of § 1 of the 
Sherman Act). 
36. ld. 
37. Id. 
38. !d. 
39. Missouri v. National Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301, 1315 (8th Cir. 1980). See 
also Hurwitz, supra note 4, at 112. 
40. The term "monopsony" refers to a market situation in which buying power for a 
given product or service is concentrated in a single source. That single buyer is called a 
"monopsonist." For further discussion on this point, see infra text accompanying note 118. 
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government's proposed commercial arrangement.41 Concerted action may be 
necessary to counter that power.42 · 
When such a mixture of motives and interests is present in a boycott, 
the determination of antitrust liability must be predicated on an examination of 
all relevant factors. This is not to say that a commercial boycott that raises 
First Amendment concerns should never be found to be unlawful under the 
antitrust laws. Rather, a determination of the illegality of such a boycott should 
not be predicated upon a presumptory analytic shorthand. The proper deter-
mination entails at least a limited assessment not only of the participants' 
motives, but also of the history of the market and the actual harm to competi-
tion. · 
Numerous economic and professional regulations outside the antitrust 
context have been struck down by the Supreme Court on First Amendment 
grounds, precisely because the regulations imposed mechanical presumptions 
analogous to the per se approach in antitrust law. In re Primus, 43 for example, 
involved an attorney who was engaged in private practice in South Carolina 
and also affiliated with the South Carolina branch of the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU). The attorney gave a speech on the legal rights of 
women who had been sterilized as a pre-condition to receipt of public medical 
assistance. He was disciplined under the State's attorney practice rules 
because he provided, at the request of a member of the audience, the mailing 
address of the ACLU as a potential source of legal representation. The Court 
declared that where First Amendment rights are at issue, it would not tolerate 
the degree of imprecision that often characterizes government regulation of 
purely commercial conduct. The Court held that the attorney's activity fell 
within the generous zone of protection afforded political expression and asso-
ciational freedoms. 44 
Similarly, in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind45 the Court invali-
dated, as an abridgement of First Amendment free speech rights, a North 
Carolina charitable solicitations statute that governed the solicitation of chari-
table contributions by professional fundraisers. The statute defined a prima 
facie "reasonable fee" that a professional fundraiser was permitted to charge 
as a percentage of the funds solicited. It required that professional fundraisers 
disclose to potential donors, prior to an appeal, the gross percentage of funds 
retained in prior solicitations. Professional fundraisers also had to obtain 
licenses before engaging in charitable solicitations. 46 In striking down the 
statute, the Court reasserted its long-standing position that the First 
Amendment does not permit the government to sacrifice speech for effi-
ciency.47 
41 . See Hurwitz, supra note 4, at 112 n.224. 
42. For more discussion on this point vis-a-vis the SCTI..A boycott see infra text 
accompanying notes 115-23. 
43. 436 u.s. 412 (1978). 
44. ld. at434. 
45. 487 u.s. 781 (1988). 
46. ld. 
4 7. ld. at 795. See also Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 
(1980) (the Court invalidated as overbroad and in violation of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments an ordinance barring solicitations of contributions by charitable organizations not 
using 75% of their receipts for charitable purposes); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
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It is a long-established tenet of First Amendment jurisprudence that it is 
a finely drawn line between speech that is unconditionally guaranteed and 
speech that may legitimately be regulated or suppressed.48 Only considera-
tions of the greatest urgency can justify restrictions on speech, and the validity 
of such restraints depends upon a careful analysis of the facts in each case. 49 
Ill. MIXING POLITICS AND ECONOMICS: A CASE STUDY 
A. The Political Background ofthe SCTLA Boycott 
In SCT£A,SO the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the action 
of a group of lawyers that had organized and participated in a concerted 
refusal to represent indigent criminal defendants in the District of Columbia 
Superior Court until the District government increased the statutorily man-
dated fees paid the lawyers. The question was whether this conduct violated 
federal antitrust laws and, if so, whether it was nevertheless protected by the 
First Amendment to the Constitution.st. 
To appreciate the intensity of the political component of the SCTLA 
boycott, it is important to understand how the boycott strategy evolved. The 
SCTLA boycott was not the initial response to a perceived economic need, but 
rather a last resort, borne out of frustration with the ineffectiveness of prior 
political activity. The District of Columbia Criminal Justice Act52 (CJA) pro-
vides for the compensation of private attorneys who are appointed to repre-
sent indigent criminal defendants pursuant to the constitutional mandate of the 
Sixth Amendment.53 Eighty-five percent of all indigent defendants in the 
District of Columbia are represented by an attorney appointed under the 
CJA.54 
In Schneider, the Court struck down as an unconstitutional invasion of free speech a municipal 
ordinance that prohibited door-to-door solicitation and distribution of literature without a permit, 
where the necessary permit could be refused on the basis of an assessment, left to the discretion 
of the local police, of the applicant's character. The Court acknowledged that, while fraud is 
often perpetrated in the guise of charitable appeals, such offenses are subject to prohibition and 
prosecution under laws specifically designed to address those problems. Although enforcement 
of those laws may be less efficient or less convenient than according the police broad 
discretionary censorship authority, that is an insufficient basis on which to allow an abridgement 
of fundamental First Amendment rights. 308 U.S. at 164. 
48. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958) in which the Court held that a 
state program that required taxpayers applying for a particular tax exemption to prove they did 
not advocate the overthrow of the government was invalid as a denial of freedom of speech 
without the procedural safeguards afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
49. !d. at 521. 
50. FfC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
51. !d. 
52. D.C. CODE ANN.§§ 11-2601 to -2609 (1981 & Supp. 1987). 
53. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1%3), the Court held that the Sixth Amendment's provision that in all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have the assistance of counsel was made 
mandatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
54. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FfC, 856 F.2d 225, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
Of the remaining 15%, 8-10% are represented by full-time public defenders, generally in more 
serious felony cases, and the rest by third-year law students (in routine misdemeanors) or by·pro 
bono private attorneys. 
1992] MIXED-MOTIVE BOYCOTTS 717 
Any member of the District of Columbia Bar in good standing may reg-
ister with the CJA office of the Public Defenders Service to receive appoint-
ments.ss A commissioner or a superior court judge makes appointments by 
comparing the list of eligible defendants with a list of lawyers who have indi-
cated their availability for that day.56 At the time of the boycott over 1200 
lawyers were registered for CJA appointments. In practice, however, most 
appointments went to a small group of approximately one hundred "CJA regu-
lars" who earned all or most of their income representing indigent defen-
dants.57 
From 1970 until the boycott in 1983, fees paid CJA lawyers were 
capped at $30 per hour for court time and $20 per hour for out-of~court time, 
subject to a maximum of $1000 per case for felonies, $400 for misdemeanors, 
and $1000 per case for appeals.ss At the time of the boycott, CJA compensa-
tion levels were set at the hourly scale established by the federal Criminal 
Justice Act.59 The maximum compensation available to an individual lawyer 
under the federal Act was $42,000 per annum; however, the average CJ A 
lawyer made approximately $20,000 per year before the boycott.60 In 1975, as 
a result of a general concern among members of the bar, a joint committee of 
the District of Columbia Judicial Conference of the Bar and the District of 
Columbia Bar (Joint Committee) concluded that the CJA rates drove talented 
lawyers out of CJA practice or encouraged those lawyers who remained to 
provide less than adequate representation.6t The joint committee recom-
mended an increase in CJ A rates, concluding that such an increase was a 
necessity in order to attract and retain good criminal lawyers and to assure 
their ability to render effective assistance of counsel. The District government 
took no action pursuant to the recommendation.62 In 1982, a Report of the 
Court System Study Committee of the District of Columbia Bar63 recom-
mended an increase to levels proposed in the earlier joint committee report. A 
bill was introduced in the District of Columbia City Council to raise the hourly 
rate to $50, but it died in committee without a hearing.64 During this same 
period, members of SCTLA began lobbying efforts aimed at increasing CJ A 
compensation levels. Early efforts included conversations with Chief Judge 
Moultrie of the District of Columbia Superior Court, Herbert Reid, legal coun-
sel to then Mayor Marion Barry, and Wiley Branton, then Dean of Howard 
University Law School. The chief judge indicated that he believed a rate 
increase was deserved, but would offer no public support of pending legislation 
because the superior court might be called upon to rule on its legality. The 
mayor's counsel advised that the mayor was sympathetic to the lawyers' 
position, but would not support legislation absent the urging of the chief judge. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(l) (1985). 
60. Superior Court Trial Lawyers, 856 F.2d at 228. 
61. Id. at229. 
62. ld. 
63. I d. (Reprinted as Senate Print 98-34, 98th Con g., 1st Sess., Comm. on Govt'l 
Affairs (Horsky Report)). 
64. Id. 
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Dean Branton recognized that no organized, influential constituency existed to 
lobby on the lawyers' behalf. He concluded that the prospect for passage of 
favorable legislation was poor unless the lawyers did "something dramatic to 
attract attention in order to get relief."65 
In March 1983, a new bill was introduced that proposed a rate increase 
to $35 per hour for CJA work. Despite favorable testimony before the council 
from various sources, the bill failed in committee due to a lack of available 
money to fund the increase. Subsequent efforts to encourage an increase in 
federal funding to support a raise in CJA rates also failed for lack of an initia-
tive from either the legislative or judicial branch of the District of Columbia 
govemment.66 Finally in 1983, SCTLA turned its efforts from lobbying for a 
legislative rate increase to organizing a boycott of further CJA appointments at 
the prevailing rates. The SCTLA "Strike Committee" adopted as its goal rate 
increases to $55 per hour for court time and $45 per hour for out-of-court 
time. In a meeting on August 11, 1983, approximately 100 CJA lawyers 
agreed not to accept new cases as of September 6 if the rates had not been 
raised by that date. The decision of the membership was memorialized in a 
petition signed by a number of the lawyers.67 
Beginning September 6, 1983, the majority of CJA regulars stopped 
accepting new appointments. SCTLA also actively sought to publicize the boy-
cott with press kits, organized picket lines, rallies, and television interviews in 
an effort to educate the public about the plight of CJA lawyers in the expecta-
tion that it would exert public pressure on the District govemment.68 The 
impact of the boycott was severe. After only a few days, the Public Defender 
Service was inundated with cases. The response of the private bar was inad-
equate to meet the demand.69 On September 15, citing the inability to provide 
effective assistance of counsel in light of the case overload, the Public 
Defender Service notified the mayor of the extreme seriousness of the situa-
tion and urged the mayor to declare immediately his support for a rate 
increase.70 The chief judge confirmed the Public Defender Services' claim that 
the criminal justice system was approaching the point of crisis. In response, 
the mayor informed SCTLA representatives that he would support emergency 
legislation to immediately raise CJA rates to $35 per hour and would support a 
second bill, which would go through the normal legislative process, to further 
increase CJA hourly rates to $55 for court time and $45 for out-of-court 
time.71 On September 21, 1983 the SCTLA boycott ended.72 
65. ld. 
66. I d. at 229-30. 
67. ld. at 230. 
68. ]d. 
69. Id. 
70. Icl at231. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. It is interesting to note that in the nine years since the 1983 rate increase, there has 
been no subsequent raise in CJA rates. CJA lawyers, who contend that they need around $50 an 
hour to stay even with inflation in 1992, are once again pushing for additional money. Court-
appointed criminal defense lawyers in Los Angeles currently receive $55 to $80 dollars an hour; 
federal public defenders receive $75 an hour. The going rate for solo practioners and lawyers in 
small firms handling criminal defense work in the District of Columbia is $125 to $150 an hour. 
As was the case in 1983, the CJA lawyers are having little success in attracting support. See 
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The Federal Trade Commission then filed its complaint and the litigation 
ensued.73 
B. The Supreme Court,s Analysis: Succwnbing to the Tyranny of Labels 
The Supreme Court took a per se approach in its analysis of the SCTLA 
facts. The Court determined the Trial Lawyers' boycott to be a horizontal 
arrangement among competitors that was "'a naked restraint' on price and 
output"74 subject to per se antitrust analysis. It is interesting that the FTC, the 
administrative law judge, the court of appeals and Justice Stevens in his opin-
ion for the majority all referred to the Trial Lawyers' conduct as a price- fix-
ing agreement.75 This label is, however, a misnomer. The Trial Lawyers did 
not actually engage in a price-fixing agreement, but rather in a concerted 
refusal to deal. They did not agree upon a specific price,76 and ultimately con-
cluded the boycott after accepting the take-it-or-leave-it price presented to 
them by the District of Columbia government. Perhaps mislabeling the Trial 
Lawyers' conduct made it easier for the FTC, and later the courts, to justify 
application of the per se doctrine despite the complexity of the facts of the 
case. 
Having characterized the boycott as a price-fixing agreement, the Court 
took issue with what it called "a new exception to the per se rules"77 carved 
out by the court of appeals' decision. Following the Supreme Court's decision 
generally Saundra Torry, D.C. Court-Appointed lAwyers Want a Raise-After Nine Years, 
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 21, 1992 (Bus. Supp.), at 5. 
73. FfC v. Superior Trial Court Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 416 (1990). In its 
complaint, the Federal Trade Commission (FfC) alleged that the CJA lawyers entered into an 
agreement to restrain trade by refusing to compete for or accept new appointments under the Act 
until the fees offered under the CJA program were increased. The FfC complaint characterized 
the activity of SC1LA as a conspiracy to flx prices and to conduct a boycott in violation of 
section 5 ofthe Federal Trade Commission Act. 
In response, SC1LA proffered three defenses-that the boycott was justified by the 
public interest in obtaining better representation for indigent defendants; that the boycott was a 
form of legislative petitioning protected under ~!?stern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr 
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); and, that it was a form of political action protected by 
the First Amendment under NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982). The 
administrative law judge rejected all three defenses but, nevertheless, dismissed the complaint on 
the grounds that the District of Columbia officials who represented the target of the boycott 
recognized its net beneficial effect and that, from a practical standpoint, there was no harm done. 
On review of the administrative law judge's decision, the FfC found SC1LA' s conduct 
had substantial anticompetitive effects and issued a cease-and-desist order to prohibit the 
initiation of similar conduct in the future. The court of appeals vacated the FfC order and 
remanded for a determination of whether SC1LA had significant market power. The court 
concluded that the boycott had an element of expression warranting First Amendment protection 
which should not be restricted by the application of an otherwise valid per se rule, and instead 
required that violations of antitrust law be proved rather than presumed. 
The Supreme Court granted the FfC's petition for certiorari and SC1LA's cross-
petition. See SCTLA, 493 U.S. at 416-23. 
74. ld. at423 (citations omitted). 
75. Id. at420-23. 
7 6. While the "Strike Committee" of SC1LA initially adopted as a general goal of the 
boycott rate increases of $55 per hour for in court and $45 per hour for out-of-court time, the 
SC1LA membership, as evidenced by the petition the lawyers signed, agreed only to boycott 
CJA cases until their rates were increased. ld. at 416. 
77. I d. at 428. 
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in United States v. O'Brien,78 the court of appeals had concluded that the 
expressive component of the SCTLA boycott compelled the courts to apply 
the antitrust laws "prudently and with sensitivity" and with "a special solici-
tude for the First Amendment rights" involved.79 It held that "the governmen-
tal interest in prohibiting boycotts was not sufficient to justify a restriction on 
the communicative element of the boycott unless the FTC could prove, not 
merely presume, that the boycotters had market power."SO 
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, declared that the appeals 
court's holding "exaggerates the significance of the expressive component [of 
the] boycott."Sl He was troubled that the holding "denigrated the importance 
of [the per se rule]" by implying that most economic boycotts do not have an 
expressive component and that the characterization of price-fixing and boy-
cotts as illegal per se was merely an administrative efficiency unless the com-
petitors had actual market power.s2 The Court opined that, even if the 
assumptions implicit in tl1e court of appeals' holding were valid, O'Brien would 
afford the SCTLA boycott no protection because the per se rule in antitrust 
analysis satisfies the O'Brien test. According to the Court, the administrative 
efficiency interests in antitrust regulation are unusually compelling: They 
reflect the long-standing judgment that the prohibited practices by their nature 
have the potential to substantially effect competition.s3 
Further, according to the majority, every concerted refusal to deal has 
an expressive component, inasmuch as competitors must exchange their 
views about their intended goals and how to achieve them and must commu-
nicate their terms to the target. Thus, the Court found there to be nothing 
uniquely expressive about the SCTLA boycott and, therefore, nothing that 
would merit exemption from the per se rules of antitrust law.s4 Likening the 
per se rules in antitrust law to per se restrictions in other areas such as stunt 
78. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The O'Brien Court upheld the conviction ofan individual 
who publicly burned his Selective Service registration card in protest of the Vietnam War. The 
Court stated: 
[W]hen "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of 
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the 
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment 
freedoms .... [W]e think ... a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is 
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or 
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First 
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that 
interest. 
ld. at 376-77. 
79. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226, 233-34 (D.C. Cir. 
1988). 
8 0. See id. at 250. 
81 . SCTLA, 490 U.S. at 430. 
82. Id. 
83. /d. at 430-33. "The administrative efficiency interests in antitrust regulation are 
unusually compelling. The per se rules avoid 'the necessity for an incredibly complicated and 
prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved ... .'" Id. at 
430. (citations omitted). (It is interesting to note that Justice Stevens uses the term "compelling 
interests" here-a term that is normally reserved for review of those classifications of rights 
considered to be fundamental and subject to strict scrutiny.) 
84. Id. at430-33. 
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flying in congested areas or speeding,85 the Court concluded that the SCTLA 
boycott could legitimately be subjected to a presumption of illegality absent 
proof of actual harm or an inquiry into market power.86 
The Court's analysis gave short shrift to the First Amendment interests 
implicated by the Trial Lawyers' conduct.87 Admittedly, the behavior of the 
Trial Lawyers was not automatically immunized by the First Amendment.88 
But, as Justice Brennan observed in dissent: "The issue in this case is not 
whether boycotts may ever be punished under [the antitrust laws] consistent 
with the First Amendment; rather, the issue is how the government may 
determine which boycotts are illegal." 89 A group's concerted effort, by use of 
market power, to coerce government through economic means may subject 
the actors to antitrust liability. But when that group persuades the government 
to make a certain policy decision by virtue of the force of its ideas rather than 
its market power, there can be no antitrust liability even though the activity 
may be in part economically motivated and may potentially harm competi-
tors.90 The per se rule in antitrust law and classic First Amendment doctrine 
are on a collision course in mixed-motive boycotts. The Court in SCTIA failed 
to avert that collision. 
The record in SCTIA contained substantial evidence indicating that 
District of Columbia government officials, including the mayor and the city 
council, the chief judge of the District of Columbia Superior Court and the 
District of Columbia judiciary generally, and members of the District of 
Columbia Bar supported an increase in CJA rates.91 The obstacle to the rate 
increase was not a lack of official support, but a lack of available funds and a 
perception on the part of government officials that there would be limited pub-
lic support for such an increase.92 The Trial Lawyers were advised to do 
"something dramatic to attract attention . . . to get ... relief' since they were 
lacking an influential constituency to lobby on their behalf.93 Heeding this 
85. I d. at 433. 
86. I d. at 436. 
87. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). In invalidating as an infringement of 
First Amendment rights a Virginia statute under which the NAACP's practice of instituting legal 
proceedings in school desegregation cases was deemed to be criminally "improper solicitation of 
legal business," the Court in Button stated that "a state cannot foreclose the exercise of 
constitutional rights by mere labels." Id. at 429. See also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 
(1975) (holding unconstitutional under the First Amendment a Virginia statute that, at that time, 
made it illegal to encourage or prompt, by sale or circulation of any publication, the procuring of 
an abortion). In Bigelow the Court stated that '"a State cannot foreclose the exercise of 
constitutional rights by mere labels.' ... Regardless of the particular label asserted by the State 
... a court may not escape the task of assessing the First Amendment interests at stake ... . "I d. at 
826 (citation omitted). 
88. SCFIA, 493 U.S. at 437 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
89. I d. at 438. 
90. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) ("Joint efforts 
to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate 
competition. Such conduct is· not illegal, either standing alone or as part of a broader scheme 
itself violative of the Sherman Act."). 
91. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FfC, 856 F.2d 226, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
"[N]o one testified [at the D.C. Council hearing on the matter] against it except insofar as the 
Executive Branch of the D.C. Government raised concerns about funding it." ld. 
92. See generally id. at 229-30. 
93. I d. at 229. 
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advice, the CJA lawyers actively sought media coverage, distributed press 
releases, and organized picket lines and rallies.94 Their actions resulted in a 
number of newspaper articles and television news stories which further publi-
cized the lawyers' claims.95 
Through the publicity generated by the boycott, the Trial Lawyers 
sought to gain public sympathy and support for their cause. That the SCTLA 
boycotters actively sought public attention lends credence to the argument 
that the boycott operated on a political level, as communicative conduct, 
rather than on an economic level. "Very few economically coercive boycotts 
seek notoriety both because they seek to escape detection and because they 
have no wider audience beyond the participants and the target."96 
The sincere effort on the part of the CJA lawyers to communicate their 
concerns to an audience beyond that directly affected was a vital aspect of 
the SCTLA boycott. The court of appeals recognized this point in relying on 
the significance of the expressive dimension of the boycott. Noting the histori-
cal use of boycotts as a dramatic means to communicate anger, the court of 
appeals concluded that the circumstances su_rrounding the SCTLA boycott 
suggested that the lawyers intended to, and in fact did, communicate a mes-
sage regarding the inadequacy of prevailing CJA rates. 
In addition, the CJA lawyers were willing to sacrifice their income. For 
some it amounted to the elimination of the only outlet for the practice of their 
professional skills.97 This hardship further attested to the strength of the 
expressive dimension of the' SCTLA boycott. By voluntarily inflicting substan-
tial financial hardship upon themselves, the CJA lawyers conveyed the inten-
sity of their feelings and the depth of their commitment more clearly and 
forcefully than they could have through any other means. It is this aspect of an 
expressive boycott that makes it a special and powerful form of political 
speech.9B 
The Supreme Court has clearly established that when a course of action 
includes both "speech" and "nonspeech" elements, that action is entitled to 
substantial First Amendment protection,99 which may not be overridden 
merely for the sake of judicial efficiency.JOO The per Se rule of antitrust analy-
sis is a presumption of illegality "[t]or the sake of business certainty and litiga-
tion efficiency" which the Court has conceded may lead to "[t]he invalidation 
94. Id. at 230. "[The Trial Lawyers] actively sought to publicize the boycott by handing 
out press kits, organizing picket lines, and staging rallies." ld. 
9 5 . See id. at 248. 
96. FfC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 451 (1990) (Brennan, 
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
97. Superior Court Trial Lawyers, 856 F.2d at 228. 
The CJA regulars accept CJA cases for a variety of reasons. Some ... have 
previous experience in public interest work and 'consider representation of the 
poor [to be] the highest calling of the legal profession.' ... Some are motivated by 
an interest in criminal litigation. And some accept appointments under the CJA 
because there are no other legal jobs available to them. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
98. See SCTLA, 493 U.S. at 449-51 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part). 
99. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). 
100. Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, 487 U.S. 781, 795 
(1988). 
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of some agreements that a full blown inquiry might [prove] to be reason-
able."lOI These two principles clash head-on in mixed-motive boycott cases. 
In applying a per se analysis in such cases, as it did in SCTLA, the Court 
engages in the very efficiency-oriented shortcuts that the First Amendment 
normally forbids. 
Further, the Court's suggestion that the SCTLA boycott was not ade-
quately expressive to qualify for First Amendment protection-that there was 
nothing about the Trial Lawyers' conduct to distinguish it from any purely 
commercial boycotti02-was at odds with established First Amendment 
jurisprudence. The Court has recently restated the method for determining the 
sufficiency of the expressive dimension of conduct with both speech and non-
speech elements: "In deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient 
communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, [the Court 
must ask] whether '[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was pre-
sent, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be 
understood by those who viewed it."'I03 The SCTLA boycott certainly satis-
fied this test. 
The First Amendment interests implicated by the totality of the circum-
stances surrounding the SCTLA boycott are clear. The Court's action in 
attaching antitrust liability on the basis of a presumption of illegality was inap-
propriate. Application of the per se rule to the SCTLA boycott restricted 
expression more broadly than was necessary to further the governmental 
interest in protecting competition and, thus, failed to satisfy the standard set 
forth by the Court in O'Brien)04 Generally, as evidenced by the SCTLA deci-
sion, to determine questions of antitrust liability in mixed-motive boycott cases 
in a manner that adequately accommodates both First Amendment values and 
competition policy, a court should undertake the kind of broad-based factual 
inquiry that the rule of reason affords. 
101. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1982) (an 
agreement among competing physicians setting maximum fees for payment from participants in 
specified insurance plans held per se unlawful under§ 1 of the Sherman Act). 
102. See supra text accompanying note 90. 
103. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 
U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)) (holding that the conviction of a protestor for burning the American 
flag as part of a political demonstration violated the First Amendment). 
104. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (rejecting a First 
Amendment challenge to a New York City ordinance regulating the volume of amplified music at 
the bandstand in Central Park); Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, 
492 U.S. 469 (1989). In considering a regulation of the State University of New York that 
prohibited the operation of private commercial enterprises in student dormitories, the Court in 
Fox held that in commercial speech analysis the validity of a government regulation does not 
require a showing that it is the least restrictive means available to accomplish the governmental 
interest, but only that it is a reasonable means, narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective. 
Id. at 477-78. 
In their treatise on antitrust law, Professors Areeda and Turner suggest a standard for 
applyi'ng the O'Brien test to political behavior with potential anticompetitive consequences. 
Under this standard, a defendant's behavior is unnecessarily detrimental to competition when it 
is extensively dangerous without being indispensable to the political activity. The three factors to 
be considered are: "(i) the severity of the danger to competition, (ii) the availability of a less 
dangerous alternative, and (iii) the customary political character of the challenged behavior." 
PHILLIP AREEDA & DoNALD F. TURNER, 1 ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION «j[ 205 (1978). See also FISHMAN, supra note 13. 
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C. The Relevance of Market Power 
The Supreme Court in SCTLA summarily dismissed the argument that 
the determinaqon of the illegality of the boycott required an assessment of the 
boycotters' market power.tos However, since the SCTLA boycott brought both 
political and economic power to bear on the District government, at least a 
limited inquiry into SCTLA's market power was essential for the Court to 
ascertain whether the boycott succeeded through persuasion, as political 
activity, or through coercion, as commercial activity.l06 
The purpose of the Sherman Act is to protect competition, not competi-
tors.l07 Thus, in order for an expressive boycott to violate the Sherman Act, it 
must have a net anticompetitive impact.lOS To determine anticompetitive 
impact, the Court must assess both the economic power of the boycotters and 
the structure of the affected market.109 
But no proof of the SCTLA boycotters' market power was ever 
offered.llO In place of proof of market power, the FTC offered an abbreviated 
market analysis that consisted largely of a conclusion drawn from a specious 
deduction: that since the boycott ultimately resulted in increased CJA rates, 
the· Trial Lawyers must have had market power. Thus, success of the boycott 
was itself offered as sufficient proof of market power.lll Unfortunately, the 
Supreme Court was content to accept the FTC's premise.112 
105. FfC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,436 (1990). 
106. See Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FfC, 856 F.2d 226, 254 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (Silberman, J., concurring). 
107. See Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (upholding 
an injunction prohibiting the merger of two corporations engaged in the manufacture and sale of 
men's, women's, and children's shoes on the ground that in the relevant market such a merger 
would create a monopoly in violation of the antitrust laws); Standard Oil Co. v. FfC, 340 U.S. 
231 (1951) (upholding a cease and desist order based upon a finding that competitors' good faith 
price differentials resulted in injury to competition). The Court in Standard Oil stated that, 
"Congress [in passing the Sherman Act] was dealing with competition, which it sought to 
protect .... " 340 U.S. at 249. 
108. 
As applied to political boycotts, the decision of whether or not the Sherman Act 
proscribes the boycott depends solely on the boycott's potential anticompetitive 
results. To determine if anticompetitive results are likely, the courts look to the 
economic power of the boycotters and to the structure of the ..• market. If, [under 
the Act, only those boycotts were proscribed] which had sufficient economic 
power to cause anticompetitive results, the "least restrictive alternative" test of 
O'Brien would be met. However, if [a boycott lacking economic power is 
proscribed], the proscription's adverse impact on speech would fail to meet the 
fourth part of the O'Brien test, since the incidental restriction on speech is greater 
than necessary to further the Act's purpose. 
Kennedy, supra note 6 at 1012; see also Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 
(1958). The Court has gone so far as to recognize a presumption of antitrust violation where 
specific acts create a "pernicious effect on competition and lack ... any redeeming virtue .... " 
Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5. See also Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 
u.s. 231, 238 (1918). 
109. See generally Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977) 
("[A]n antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would lack objective benchmarks.") 
110. Superior Court Trial Lawyers, 856 F.2d at 250-52. 
111. The court of appeals found that the FfC had presented insufficient evidence of 
SC'ILA's market power and remanded for reconsideration on this issue. See id. at 250-53. 
112. "[A]n assumption that absent proof of market power, the boycott ... was totally 
harmless ... when ... it almost produced a crisis in the administration of criminal justice in the 
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This analytic approach begged a critical question. The market power 
inquiry was necessary to judge whether the boycott succeeded as a result of 
political persuasion or economic coercion. It is conceivable that, despite a lack 
of any market power, the Trial Lawyers were able to secure a rate increase 
because the publicity attending the boycott succeeded in changing public atti-
tudes toward the need for a pay increase for representatives of indigent crimi-
nal defendants.ll3 To rely on the success of the boycott alone as evidence that 
it succeeded by virtue of economic coercion undercuts the very purpose of the 
inquiry. 
Indeed, the far more plausible interpretation of the facts is that the Trial 
Lawyers did not have market power. The CJA lawyers did not compete in a 
traditional market where their conduct could directly affect the price paid for 
their services.ll4 The fees paid the CJA lawyers were set by a political pro-
cess, not by competitive forces.! IS The demand for CJ A services was created 
not by traditional market impulses but by the constitutional requirement that 
every jurisdiction in the United States provide, at government expense, legal 
representation to criminal defendants who cannot otherwise afford counsel.116 
Pre-boycott CJA rates were substantially lower than the market price 
for legal services in the District of Columbia at the time.1I7 That the govern-
ment could buy legal services at a price less than the market price suggests 
that the District of Columbia government itself had market power in the criti-. 
cal market, that is, the market consisting of legal representation of indigent 
criminal defendants. In other words, the CJA lawyers competed in a market in 
which prices were set by a single customer with power to control the market. 
Thus, the District of Columbia government had monopsony power.IIS 
District and when it achieved its economic goal ... is [inconsistent with the Court's antitrust 
jurisprudence]." FfC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. 411, 436 (1990). 
113. Superior Court Trial Lawyers, 856 F.2d at 251. 
114. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) (suit by hosiery 
manufacturer against labor organization to recover, under the Sherman Act, treble the amount of 
damages it incurred as the result of a strike staged by the union at its factory). The Court stated 
in Apex Hosiery, "[1]he restraints, actual or intended, prohibited by the Sherman Act are only 
those which are so substantial as to affect market prices. Restraints on competition or on the 
course of trade ... is not enough, unless the restraint is shown to have ... an effect upon prices 
in the market .... " !d. at 500-01. 
115. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53. 
116. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
117. FfC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. 411, 443 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
118. The term "monopsony" is used to describe a market situation in which there is a 
single buyer for a given product or service from a large number of sellers. That single buyer is 
said to have monopsonist power. By contrast, the term "monopoly" is used to describe a market 
in which ownership or control of a product or service by a single supplier permits domination of 
the commodity or service in a particular market, usually for control over or manipulation of 
prices. The controlling supplier is said to have monopoly power. See WEBSTER'S THIRD 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (UNABRIDGED) 1463 (1981). Just as seller concentration 
facilitates the ability to raise price above competitive market levels, buyer concentration makes it 
easier for buyers to depress price below competitive levels; in each case output will be below the 
competitive norm. See PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, 4 ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, 'JI964 (1980). But see 
Superior Court Trial Lawyers v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226, 235 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("We do not 
read petitioners' characterization of the market for CJA services ... to suggest that the District of 
Columbia is a 'monopsonist' .... ") 
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The government was not completely free to choose what may have 
been for it the optimum combination of price and quantity.II9 That fact, how-
ever, did not lessen its market power. A monopsonist generally is not 
completely free to make such a choice. It must offer a price high enough to 
secure the quantity it needs; were it to set its price too low, its suppliers would 
leave the market)20 While there was a limit to the District of Columbia 
government's capacity to exploit the CJA lawyers, it was, nonetheless, able to 
exploit them by paying a less than competitive price)2I Prior to the boycott it 
may be presumed that the CJA lawyers were faced with the choice to either 
forego their livelihood or accept appointments at a price lower than market 
price.I22 The boycott, then, could be characterized not as the exercise of mar-
ket power by the lawyers, but as a collective attempt by the lawyers to offset 
the monopsonist power of the District of Columbia government in the pur-
chase of CJA services.123 
Further, the Court's characterization of the SCTLA boycott as a naked 
horizontal restraint subject to per se illegality, without benefit of market 
inquiry, completely ignored the nature of the boycott target. The SCTLA boy-
cott was a concerted refusal by a limited segment of the District of Columbia 
Bar to undertake court-appointed representation of indigent criminal defen-
dants. The target of the boycott was the District of Columbia government, 
specifically, the District of Columbia legislature and its courts.124 At all times 
throughout the course of the boycott, the District of Columbia government had 
the indisputable power to require all members of the District of Columbia bar 
(or any sub-set of the District bar, including the criminal defense bar, gener-
ally, or the 1200 lawyers who were registered for CJA appointments,I25 or 
simply the members of SCTLA themselves) to accept court-appointed repre-
sentation of indigent criminal defendants.J26 
119. The FfC found that: 
[T]he city's purchase of CJA legal services for indigents is based on competition. 
The price offered by the city is based on competition, because the city must attract 
a sufficient number of individual lawyers to meet its needs at that price. The city 
competes with other purchasers of legal services to obtain an adequate supply of 
lawyers, and the city's offering price is an element of that competition .... If the 
offering price had not attracted a sufficient supply of qualified lavryers willing to 
accept CJA assignments for the city to fulfill its constitutional obligation, then 
presumably the city would have increased its offering price to make its offer more 
attractive .... [H]owever, the city's offering price before the boycott apparently 
was sufficient to obtain the amount and quality of legal services that it needed. 
Superior Court Trial Lawyers v. FTC, 856 F. 2d 226,232 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
120. See generallyGEORGEJ. STIGLER, 'IHETHEORYOFPRICE 87,205 (3d ed. 1966). 
121. In 1983 the typical billing rate for private attorneys in major cities with 11 to 20 years 
of experience was $123 per hour; the rate for those with less than two years of experience was 
$64 per hour. SCTLA, 493 U.S. at 443 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
122. See supra note 97. For a similar discussion of the economics of medicaid rate 
setting, see Mitchell D. Raup, Medicaid Boycotts by Health Care Providers: A Noerr-
Pennington Defense, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1393, 1396 (1984). 
123. See generally Hurwitz, supra note 4, at 112. 
124. SCTIA, 493 U.S. at 453 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
125. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
126. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In Powell, the Court found that 
defendants convicted of rape and sentenced to death were denied due process of law and equal 
protection in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment when they were denied a fair, 
impartial, and deliberate trial; were denied the right of counsel in pretrial preparation; and, were 
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This plenary power is relevant to an accurate characterization of the 
SCTLA boycott in two ways. First, the District of Columbia government had 
the authority to expand the pool of available lawyers from which court 
appointments could be made. Applying the traditional economic concept of 
cross-elasticity of demand,l27 there were presumably other lawyers whose 
services could be substituted for the boycotting CJA regulars, thus significantly 
limiting any market power the boycotters may have had. Second, despite the 
Trial Lawyers' boycott, they could not in fact relieve themselves of the obliga-
tion to accept court appointments. Thus, the SCTLA boycott was, as Justice 
Blackmun stated, a dramatic gesture lacking any real economic power.l28 The 
boycotters could not force the government's compliance with their demands 
by constricting the supply of l~gal services. Instead, they placed the govern-
ment in the untenable position of either agreeing to the rate increase or using 
its political muscle to break the strike. Thus the government choice was likely 
the result of political, not economic pressure.I29 
Indeed, looking at what actually happened, the primary effect of the 
boycott on the market for CJ A services was procompetitive as the pool of 
tried before juries in which members of their race were systematically excluded. The Court stated 
that the court's power to appoint counsel to defend one charged with a crime, "even in the 
absence of statute, can not be questioned. Attorneys are officers of the court, and are bound to 
render service when required by such an appointment." Jd. at 73. See also SCTLA, 493 U.S. at 
452,453 (Brennan, J., concurring in part; Blackmun, J., dissenting in part). 
Underfunded and overburdened public defender systems and a less than overwhelming 
pro bono response from the private bar are problems with which many, if not most, states must 
grapple. Individual judges have begun to exercise the plenary power of the court to institute 
innovative responses to the predicament. For example, in November, 1991 a Knoxville, 
Tennessee judge ordered all private lawyers-including the city's mayor, who had never before 
handled a criminal case-to take on indigent defendants without compensation. Even more 
recently, when faced with a comparable circumstance and a request by one overworked public 
defender who asked to be relieved from handling further cases until the state legislature rectified 
the injustice to criminal defendants posed by the lack of funding, Louisiana District Court Judge 
Calvin Johnson declared the entire New Orleans public defender system unconstitutional. He 
concluded that the tremendous per attorney case overload (more than 500 cases per attorney) 
prevented attorneys from providing adequate representation to their clients, and ordered the state 
to come up with money to fix it. The state has appealed the ruling to the Louisiana Supreme 
Court. See Ruth Marcus, Public Defender Systems Tried by Budget Problems, THE 
WASHINGTON POST, March 8, 1992, at AI. Similarly, when two criminal defendants stood 
before Montgomery County, Maryland Circuit Judge DeLawrence Beard without lawyers as a 
result of the Public Defenders Office's lack of funds to hire outside counsel, the judge took the 
matter into his own hands. Calling a short recess, he went into the hallway outside his 
courtroom, buttonholed two lawyers who were leaving the law library and brought them into the 
courtroom for a 30-minute hearing. Veronica T. Jennings, Weighing Maryland's Deficit on the 
Scales of Justice: Budget Cuts Constrain Public Defender Office, THE WASHINGTON POST, 
January 7, 1991, Bl. 
127. See generally United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 
(1956). In a suit against a cellophane manufacturer for monopolization of trade in violation of the 
Sherman Act, the DuPont Court found that cellophane's interchangeability with other materials 
sufficed to make it part of the flexible packaging materials market and that the cellophane 
manufacturer therefore lacked monopoly control over that market. The Court stated, "When a 
product is controlled by one interest, without substitutes available in the market, there is 
monopoly power." Jd. at 396. 
128. SCTLA, 493 U.S. at 454 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
129. Jd. See also Jane W. Meisel, Note, Now or Never: Is There Antitrust Liability for 
Noncommercial Boycotts?, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1334 (1980). 
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attorneys seeking CJA cases increased subsequent to the boycott.J30 A con-
certed refusal to deal in which neither the aim nor the effect was the inhibition 
of competitive entry into the market by other equivalent suppliers cannot 
reasonably be adjudged anticompetitive in nature.J3I Where such concerted 
action succeeds, it necessarily does so by virtue of the force of political sua-
sion, rather than economic might. In such instance, a proper assessment of the 
nature of the boycott can only be derived from, at the very least, a limited 
analysis of market power. 
IV. BALANCING FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS AND 
COMPETITION POLICY IN MIXED-MOTIVE BOYCOTT 
CASES 
A. Proposalfora New Approach 
Over time, the Supreme Court has recognized exemptions from the fed-
eral antitrust laws for certain concerted conduct that would otherwise be 
subject to antitrust liability.I32 In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. 
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,I33 the Court carved out such an exemption for the 
conduct of individuals or businesses joined together in a concerted effort to 
petition the government. In Noerr, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
Sherman Act was intended to apply to concerted commercial activities, not 
concerted activities directed at influencing the legislative or executive pro-
cess.J34 Observing that there was no suggestion in the legislative history of the 
130. After the boycott 100 to 120 lawyers called in for cases daily whereas 40 to 60 did so 
before the rates increased. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FfC, 856 F.2d 226, 238 n.18 
(D.C. Cir. 1988). 
131. See Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa. 
1980), rev'd on other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980). In an action by an oil company 
against one of its retailers the Waldman court held that the action of the retailer, in concert with 
other dealers, to close gasoline stations to express dissatisfaction with government energy 
policies was beyond the reach of the federal antitrust laws. The court stated that the per se 
doctrine "should only be applied to concerted refusals that are intended to drive out competitors 
or to keep them out, but not those in which the concerted action is designed to achieve some 
other goal." !d. at 764. 
132. For example, exemptions from federal antitrust laws have long been recognized for 
the concerted activities of various regulated industries, for agricultural cooperatives, for labor 
organizations, and for governmental action. See generally, SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 717-51. 
133. 365 U.S. 127 (1961). Noerr was an action by long-distance trucking companies 
against twenty-four major railroads for violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act in the use of a 
deceptive publicity campaign directed toward obtaining legislation adverse to the trucking 
industry. The Court held that "the Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more persons from 
associating together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to take a particular 
action .... "!d. at 136. The Court reaffrrmed this view four years later in United Mine Workers 
of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657,670 (1965) in which the Court considered the validity 
of a union-multiemployer wage/benefit agreement that favored larger coal companies in the 
industry, and that allegedly was intended to drive small competitors from the market. In order to 
further the terms of the agreement, the union and the larger companies lobbied the Secretary of 
Labor to establish a minimum wage for employees of coal contractors at a level higher than that 
of other industries, which made it difficult for small contractors to compete. The Court declared 
that "Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public officials 
regardless of the intent or purpose." !d. at 670. Thus, "the Noerr doctrine" is sometimes also 
referred to as "theNoerr-Pennington doctrine." 
134. "The proscriptions of the [Sherman Act], tailored as they are for the business world, 
are not at all appropriate for application in the political arena." 365 U.S. at 141. 
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Act of an intent by Congress to regulate political activity, the Court held that a 
broader construction of the Act would infringe upon the First Amendment 
right to petition)35 Consequently, joint activities that may be unlawful in the 
commercial realm fall outside the scope of the Act when their purpose is to 
influence legislation, either directly or by rallying public support and generating 
political pressure.136 
The SCTLA Court conceded that the objective of the Trial Lawyers' 
boycott was the enactment of favorable legislation, conduct that it had recog-
nized in Noerr as being beyond the reach of the Act even when the sole pur-
pose is the imposition of a restraint on competitors. Still, it distinguished 
SCTLA from Noerr by labeling the restraint in Noerr as "the intended 
consequence of public action," while the SCTLA boycott was "the means by 
which [the Trial Lawyers] sought to obtain favorable legislation."l37 The 
Court's determination that the SCTLA boycott was beyond the realm of Noerr 
protection, grounded as it was in a means/end distinction, is inconsistent with 
the holding in Noerr and the policy promoted there)38 
The Trial Lawyers' boycott in SCTLA was undertaken expressly to 
influence the government of the District of Columbia. The Trial Lawyers' con-
duct was played out entirely in the public arena. Prior to the boycott, the Trial 
Lawyers engaged in a number of lobbying efforts to encourage the District 
government to increase CJA·rates, including meeting with the mayor and the 
chief judge of the superior court, and testifying before the city councii.I39 
135. "We accept as the starting point for our consideration of the case, the same basic 
construction of the Sherman Act adopted by the courts below-that no violation of the Act can 
be predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement oflaws." /d. at 135. 
"[fo impute to the Sherman Act] a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but political activity 
... would raise important constitutional questions. The right of petition is one of the freedoms 
protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot ... lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade 
these freedoms." /d. at 137-38. 
136. The Noerr Court took a two-faceted approach in fashioning the "petitioning 
defense." First, when a restraint is the result of valid governmental action, the Court recognized 
an absolute immunity from antitrust liability for those urging the action. The Court applied this 
principle to the cla~ that the railroads' solicitation for the passage of laws harmful to the 
trucking industry violated the antitrust laws. See id. at 136-39. Second, when an anticompetitive 
restraint results directly from private action, antitrust liability will not arise from that restraint if 
the restraint is incidental to a valid attempt to influence governmental action. It was this principle 
that the Court applied to the claim that the railroads' publicity campaign itself, which used 
deceptive and allegedly unethical practices, violated the Sherman Act. See id. at 140-41. 
137. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,425 (1990). 
138. The SCTLA Court relied heavily on the decision in Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. 
Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988), which held that Noerr immunity did not apply to a 
manufacturer's efforts to influence the setting of a private association's product standards, that 
were routinely adopted by state and local governments, as support for its denial of Noerr 
protection to the SC1LA boycott. See SCTLA, 493 :U.S. at 425. This reliance was misplaced, 
however, because the decision in Allied Tube was based not on the fact that the alleged restraint 
was the means used to lobby for government action as opposed to the consequence of the action, 
but rather on the fact that the "petitioning activity" was directed toward a private, non legislative, 
nongovernmental entity. In its analysis, the Allied Tube Court acknowledged that the Noerr 
defense applies whether the effort to influence involves "direct" or "indirect" petitioning of 
government, but after examining the nature of the activity as a whole, it concluded that the 
activity at issue involved efforts to influence a private voluntary organization which cannot be 
accorded the same immunity given legislative lobbying or petitioning in the political arena. See 
Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 502-07. 
139. See, supra text accompanying note 61. 
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Pursuant to a well-publicized plan, when those efforts failed, they initiated the 
boycott.140 Concurrent with the boycott the lawyers engaged in an extensive 
media campaign.141 The ultimate objective of the boycott was legislation; its 
intermediate goal was to inflict injury on the District government in the hope of 
achieving that objective.142 The lawyers' efforts were intended to influence 
the District of Columbia legislature through the mobilization of public support. 
In light of its holding in Noerr, the Court should have recognized a "legislative 
petitioning" defense to antitrust liability for the SCTLA boycotters. 
Alternatively, the SCTLA Court could have exempted the Trial 
Lawyers' boycott from antitrust liability because the boycott was protected 
political communication, an approach it had taken in an earlier case, NAACP 
v. Claiborne Hardware.143 In Claiborne Hardware the Court examined the 
factual context surrounding the boycott, including the activities that accompa-
nied it,l44 and held that the boycott constituted constitutionally protected activ-
ity. The Court concluded that the "established elements of speech, assembly, 
association, and petition, 'though not identical, are inseparable."'l45 Instead, 
the SCTLA Court distinguished the Claiborne Hardware boycotters who, the 
Court said, "sought no special advantage for themselves" from the Trial 
Lawyers whose "undenied objective . . . was an economic advantage for 
those who agreed to participate."l46 This distinction is not entirely justified by 
the facts of Claiborne Hardware,l47 but even if it is true, it cannot sustain the 
Court's denial of constitutional protection to the SCTLA boycott.l48 When con-
140. SCTLA, 493 U.S. at 414. 
141. ld. at 449 n.8. 
142. The District of Columbia government played a "dual role" in this case. In its role of 
"government as consumer," (its capacity to compel the provision of legal services to criminal 
indigents notwithstanding), its relationship vis-a-vis SC1LA was like that of any customer to 
supplier. See id. at 442 n.9. But it was also cast in the role of "government as legislature." In 
that capacity, its relationship vis-a-vis SC1LA was like that of any lawmaking body to the 
people whose interests it represents. While the target of the Trial Lawyers' boycott was the 
"government as consumer," it was designed to influence the "government as legislature." Given -
the plenary power of a legislature, economic pressure exerted against it can only succeed in the 
context of a successful political campaign. For a related discussion of this point sec Superior 
Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FfC, 856 F.2d 226, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Silberman, J., 
concurring). 
143. 458 U.S. 886 (1982). In Claiborne Hardware the Court upheld a boycott by black 
citizens of Port Gibson, Mississippi against white merchants. The boycott was undertaken to 
secure for the black citizens rights of political and economic equality under the Constitution. 
144. "The boycott was supported by speeches and nonviolent picketing." I d. at 907. 
145. ld. at 911 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). 
146. SCTLA, 493 U.S. at 426. 
147. As the Court noted in SCTLA, the Claiborne Hardware boycott was a "politically 
motivated boycott designed to force governmental and economic change .... " I d. at 426 (quoting 
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 914). Among the economic changes sought by the boycotters 
were "the hiring of black policemen" and "[the employment of] Negro clerks and cashiers." 
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 899, 900. Presumably, some of the participants of the 
boycott would have benefited directly from the fulfillment of this demand. The Claibome 
Hardware boycott may reasonably be characterized as a "mixed-motive" boycott since it is 
highly likely that the black citizens were motivated by a mixture of both political and economic 
interests. See generally George C. Covington, Note, Constitutional Law-The First 
Amendment and Protest Boycotts: NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 62 N.C. L. REV. 399 
(1983-84). 
148. See SCTLA, 493 U.S. at 449 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
1992) MIXED-MOTIVE BOYCOTTS 731 
duct contains sufficient communicative elements to be deemed "speech,"149 
the different purpose of the speech cannot render that conduct any less 
expressive)SO Moreover, divining each and every purpose .or even the primary 
purpose of particular behavior can be an extremely difficult task. 
Unlike its opinions in the Noerr and Claiborne Hardware cases, which 
rested on the nature of the concerted conduct involved, the Court's opinion in 
SCTLA turned on the motive of the SCTLA boycotters.l51 The primary objec-
tive of the boycotters was an increase in their compensation, an economic 
advantage for themselves. The Court therefore held that the boycott violated 
antitrust law, despite the First Amendment interests implicated by the con-
duct.152 Not only was the Court's decision in SCTLA inconsistent with its 
decisions in prior mixed-motive boycott cases, its use of motive as the princi-
pal measure of antitrust liability in the SCTLA case cannot be reconciled with 
its prior decisions outside the area of antitrust law involving a combination of 
commercial and political speech.l53 
Reaching an adequate balance between First Amendment interests and 
competition policy in cases involving mixed-motive boycotts requires a new 
approach. Antitrust liability in such cases should not depend upon the applica-
tion of "the motivation test," as applied in the SCTLA decision. Instead, we 
must use a "totality of the circumstances test" that would serve not only to 
bring mixed-motive boycott cases in line with existing First Amendment 
jurisprudence, but would also provide an analytic method capable of more 
consistent application. 
1) The "Totality of the Circumstances" Test 
The crucial issue in these cases involves an assessment of whether or 
not a mixed-motive boycott falls within the boundaries of First Amendment 
protection. The totality of the circumstances test would follow a three-tiered 
analysis. First, a court should evaluate the extent of expressive content in the 
conduct. Next, it should decide if application of the antitrust laws to the boy-
cott was related to the suppression of expression. Finally, if regulation of the 
boycott was directed toward the noncommunicative aspects of the boycott 
activity, it should consider whether, in light of the political and economic 
context in which the boycott occurred, the government's interest in regulating 
the activity was sufficient to justify the incidental restriction on expr~ssion. 
149. See supra text accompanying notes 99-103. 
150. See SCTLA, 493 U.S. at 449 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
151. See supra text accompanying notes 144-46. 
152. See SCTLA, 493 U.S. at 424. 
153. See, e.g., First Nat' I Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). In Bellotti, a 
group of national banking and business corporations challenged the constitutionality of a state 
statute which forbade certain expenditures by banks and certain business corporations for the 
purpose of influencing the vote on referendum proposals that did not materially affect the 
property, business, or assets of the corporation. The Court held that the state statute abridged 
freedom of speech in violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 776. "[The statute] amounts to an 
impermissible ... prohibition of speech based on the identity of the interests that spokesmen [for 
the corporation] may represent in public debate over controversial issues .... " ld. at 784. For a 
more detailed discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 182-89. 
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a) Was the Boycott Sufficiently Expressive to Invoke First Amendment 
Protection? 
To qualify for protection under the First Amendment, conduct must be 
sufficiently endowed with elements of communication.J54 Communicative con-
duct is conduct that intends to convey a particularized message and, given the 
context in which it occurs, is likely to impart that message to those who view 
it.ISS To judge the communicative nature of a boycott, a court should consider 
such factors as: 
(1) how atypical the boycott was relative to the normal conduct of the 
participants; 156 
(2) whether the boycott was directed at the govemment;I57 
(3) whether the participants took steps to ensure or could have rea-
sonably believed that the public would be aware of the boycott;ISB 
and, 
(4) whether the boycott was the participants' only means of arousing 
public sentiment)59 
If all factors are present in a particular case the boycott should be con-
sidered expressive. The weight given the absence of one or another factor 
within the overall context of the boycott would be a matter best left to the dis-
cretion of the court. If the court deems the activity expressive, it should then 
decide if the government regulation of the conduct was related to the sup-
pression of free expression)60 
154. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (invalidating as an 
infringement of free speech the conviction of an individual under a Washington statute 
forbidding the exhibition of the United States flag to which any symbol, figure or other material 
had been attached or superimposed, for displaying a flag to which a peace symbol had been 
affixed). 
155. Conduct is communicative when "[a]n intent to convey a particularized message [is] 
present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those 
who viewed it." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 
418 u.s. 405, 410-11 (1974)). 
156. See Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759, 767-68 (M.D. 
Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980). The factors delineated here have 
been suggested by courts in other cases and have been, in some instances, applied in part within 
very fact-specific contexts. Here, however, the factors are pulled together to suggest that when 
considered as a whole they represent an analytical tool of general application for considering any 
mixed-motive boycott. 
157. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 
(1961); FfC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 451-52 (1990) (Brennan, 
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
158. See Crown Cent. Petroleum, 486 F. Supp. at 767-68. See generally Spence, 418 
U.S. at 409-11. 
159. See Crown Cent. Petroleum, 486 F. Supp. at 769; SCTLA, 493 U.S. at 447, 450-
51 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
160. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 414; Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989). Cf. 
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2461 (1991) (holding a public indecency statute 
prohibiting totally nude dancing did not violate the First Amendment). 
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b) Was the Application of the Antitrust Laws to the Boycott Related to 
the Suppression of Expx:ession? 
The Supreme Court has determined that when a regulation is not 
related to expression-when it is content-neutral-a court may apply the less 
stringent standard for analyzing noncommunicative conduct controls of general 
application that it formulated in its opinion in United States v. O'Brien.161 When 
it is related to expression, the regulation is outside O'Brien, and a more 
demanding standard would necessarily be applied.I62 The federal antitrust 
laws were designed to preserve free competition.I63 The enactment of the 
federal antitrust laws was clearly within the constitutional power of the gov-
ernment.I64 Protection of free and fair competition and promotion of trade 
efficiency may reasonably be deemed "important or substantial" governmental 
concerns. Thus, the first two elements of the O'Brien test are satisfied, and it 
might appear that the less stringent standard would apply. Such a conclusion 
should not, however, be hastily drawn as even content-neutral regulations 
have the potential to infringe upon protected expression.I65 Indeed, the Court 
has said that a governmental purpose to control or prevent certain activities 
that are constitutionally within the state's power to regulate may not be 
achieved by means so unnecessarily broad as to invade an area of protected 
161. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See supra note 78. See also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 
S. Ct. 2456, 2461 (1991). 
162. Non-content regulations of speech are subject to an intennediate level of scrutiny 
whereby government must demonstrate that any regulation of speech is narrowly drawn to 
further a substantial or important interest; content-based regulation, on the other hand, is subject 
to strict scrutiny and government must show that a compelling interest is advanced by a narrowly 
tailored regulation of expression. See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403. 
163. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940) (stating that the federal 
antitrust laws were enacted to prevent "restraints to free competition in business and commercial 
transactions which tended to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise control the market to 
the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and services, all of which had come to be 
regarded as a special fonn of public injury."). See also Missouri_ v. National Org. for Women, 
Inc., 620 F.2d 1301, 1305 (1980) ("[1]he public desired ... a law to destroy the power of the 
trust ... and such was the purpose of the Shennan Act. ... Clearly, Congress sought to achieve 
the preservation of free and fair competition"); Shapiro v. General Motors Corp., 472 F. Supp. 
636 (D. Md. 1979), affd, 636 F.2d 1214 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 909 (1981) 
(stating that the antitrust laws have as one of their primary goals the promotion of economic 
efficiency); M.C. Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Texas Foundries, Inc., 517 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968 (1976) (purpose of the antitrust laws is the preservation of an open, 
competitive market). For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of the Shennan Act, see 
EARL W. KINTNER, 1 1liE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANriTRUST LAWS AND 
RELATED STATUTES (1978). See also William L. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust 
Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REv. 221 (1956). 
164. The antitrust laws were enacted under the authority of the Commerce Clause of the 
United States Constitution, which grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States .... "U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 3. See also 
Washington Brewer Inst. v. U.S., 137 F.2d 964 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied 312 U.S. 776 
(1943). 
165. See NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307-09 (1964) (holding unco11stitutional as 
an infringement of associational rights protected by the First Amendment an attempt by the state 
of Alabama, under its laws governing foreign corporations doing business in the state, to compel 
the NAACP to produce the membership lists of its association). For a comprehensive analysis of 
the test developed in United States v. O'Brien and its application to the noncontent regulation of 
speech, see RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEEOI IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 54-64 (1992). 
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freedoms.I66 Consequently, application of the remaining two elements of the 
O'Brien test to the regulation of mixed-motive boycotts requires closer exami-
nation. 
The antitrust laws were enacted for reasons having nothing to do with 
speech_l67 Still, application of the laws to mixed-motive boycotts, where ele-
ments of speech and nonspeech are "inextricably intertwined,"l68 may lead to 
the suppression of protected expression.l69 A court must determine whether 
or not application of the antitrust laws to a particular mixed-motive boycott 
satisfies the third factor of O'Brien, that the governmental interest is unrelated 
to suppression of free expression. To do so, a court must ascertain whether 
the reasons advanced by the government to justify imposition of antitrust lia-
bility are based solely on the noncommunicative aspects of the boycott.l70 The 
question is whether the harm the government seeks to prevent is one that 
arises from the boycott itself, and not from the message the boycott seeks to 
convey. If it is, the harm is unrelated to free expression, and consequently, 
regulation of the boycott is unrelated to the suppression of expression. But if 
the harm the government seeks to prevent is harm that it perceives will 
emanate from the reaction others will have to the conduct-that is, from the 
message communicated-then regulation is related to the suppression of 
expression.l71 In each case, a court should require the government to show 
, that the imposition of antitrust liability with respect to the boycott at issue is 
justified by a need to prevent or to compensate for demonstrable harm caused 
by the boycott. A court should, therefore, consider the third factor of the 
O'Brien test in each mixed-motive boycott case. 
166. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (invalidating as an infringement • 
of First Amendment rights a Virginia statute under which the NAACP's practice of instituting 
legal proceedings in school desegregation cases was deemed to be criminally "improper 
solicitation" of legal business; holding "only a compelling state interest in the regulation of a 
subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment 
freedoms."). Se~ also Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946). In Hannegmz, the 
Court invalidated as censorship a decision to revoke the privilege of second·class mailing rates 
accorded a qualifying publication because its contents, while not obscene within the meaning of 
the postal obscenity statutes, was considered vulgar and in poor taste by the postmaster geneml. 
!d. at 149-51. In assessing the intent of the postal regulations as applied to the publication at 
issue, the Court held that Congress may not by withdmwal of mailing privileges place limits on 
free speech which would be unconstitutional if attempted directly./d. at 156. See also Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Court found unconstitutional a 
Connecticut statute that made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense. While the state could 
regulate the manufacture or sale of contraceptives, a law forbidding use was an invasion of the 
right of privacy emanating from the penumbml guamntees of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
ld. at 485. The Court said "the First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected 
from governmental intrusion. In like context, we have protected forms of 'association' that are 
not political in the customacy sense but pertain to the social, legal, and economic benefit of the 
members." !d. at 483 (emphasis added). 
167. See cases cited supra note 163. 
168. See cases cited infra note 188. 
169. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) ("In the domain of these 
indispensable liberties, whether of speech, press, or association, the decisions of this Court 
recognize that abridgement of such rights, even though unintended, may inevitably follow from 
varied forms of governmental action.") 
170. See SMOLLA, supra note 165, at 58. 
171. ld. 
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For example, had the Court in SCTLA given adequate consideration to 
the third factor of the 0 'Brien test in its analysis of antitrust liability for the 
Trial Lawyers' boycott, it would have required the FTC to prove, not merely 
presume, that the boycotters had market power. Only by a showing of market 
power could the FTC establish that the boycotters coerced the District of 
Columbia government's capitulation to their demands, thus causing actual 
harm to competition in violation of the antitrust laws. Without such a showing, 
one may reasonably conclude that the boycott succeeded by virtue of the 
force of the boycotters' message. In short, it was the force of that message 
that the government sought to curtail by the imposition of antitrust illegality. 
c) Was the Restriction on Expression Sufficiently Justified by the 
Governmental Interest at Stake Given the Political and Economic 
Context of the Boycott? 
Once the court has determined that the expressive content of the boy-
cott was sufficient to invoke the First Amendment and that the government's 
regulation of the boycott was directed at the harm caused by the boycott 
instead of the boycotters' message, it must then consider the last prong of the 
O'Brien test. The court must decide whether or not the incidental restriction 
on expression as a result of the regulation was no greater than necessary to 
further the government's avowed interest.172 
The, government's asserted interests in enforcing the antitrust laws are 
to enhance free and open competition, to promote economic efficiency, and to 
prevent restraint of free trade. In order for a court to decide if enforcement of 
those regulations in a particular case imposes a greater than necessary burden 
on expression, the court must determine the extent of actual harm caused or 
likely to be caused by the boycott. The concern is with the impact of antitrust 
enforcement on First Amendment freedoms. To resolve the question, the court 
should weigh the government's interest in protecting competition against the 
boycott's net anticompetitive effect.l73 
The determination of anticompetitive effect ought necessarily to take 
into account not only the content of the boycott but also the context, both eco-
nomic and political, in which it occurred. As a gauge of anticompetitiveness, a 
court might examine the circumstances surrounding the boycott to ascertain 
whether the concerted activity displayed the economic indicia of an anticom-
petitive restraint. For example, the court might ask: (1) whether the boycott 
was designed to force government to exclude new or existing competitors 
172. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). "Precision of regulation must be the 
touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms." ld. at 438. 
173. 
As applied to political boycotts, the decision of whether or not the Sherman Act 
proscribes the boycott depends solely on the boycott's potential anticompetitive 
results. To determine if anticompetitive results are likely, the courts look to the 
economic power of the boycotters and to the structure of the ... market. [If under 
the Act only those boycotts were proscribed] which had sufficient economic 
power to cause anticompetitive results, the "least restrictive alternative" test of 
O'Brien would be met. However, if [a boycott lacking economic power were 
proscribed], the proscription's adverse impact on speech would fail to meet the 
fourth part of the 0' Brien test, since the incidental restriction on speech is greater 
than necessary to further the Act's plirpose. 
Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1012. 
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from the market;I74 (2) whether the boycott exceeded in scope or duration 
what was reasonably necessary to convey the apparent message effec-
tively;I75 (3) whether the boycotters had market power;I76 and, (4) whether 
the ultimate results of the boycott were procompetitive,l77 If the economic 
indicia of a coercive boycott were absent, the anticompetitive effect of the 
boycott was limited. If the boycott succeeded, it most probably did so as a 
result of persuasion and may be deemed a form of political communication 
beyond the reach of the antitrust laws. 
The conduct in the SCTLA boycott lacked the economic characteristics 
of an anticompetitive restraint. The boycott was not designed to foreclose the 
market to other competitors and, in fact, could not have done so despite 
intent,l78 While the Trial Lawyers refused to take on any new CJA cases, they 
continued to provide effective counsel for those cases to which they had been 
appointed prior to the boycott. Moreover, they promptly ended the boycott 
upon notice from the mayor that emergency legislation mandating a rate 
increase (at a rate less than that requested by the lawyers) would be enacted. 
The boycott was reasonably limited in scope and duration to what was neces-
sary to convey the boycotters' message,I79 and the SCTLA boycott was ulti-
mately procompetitive,IBO From an economic perspective, the extent of actual 
harm caused by the boycott was marginal. If these factors are balanced 
against the government's interest in promoting economic efficiency and open 
competition, the government's interest appears insufficient to justify the bur-
den on First Amendment rights caused by imposition of antitrust liability. 
2) The Irrelevancy of Motive in Balancing First Amendment Interests 
and Competition Policy in Mixed-Motive Boycott Cases 
In prior cases, the Court has clearly indicated that political acts moti-
vated by economic self-interest are no less entitled to First Amendment pro-
tection than purely selfless acts of political protest.IBI Even when a speaker's 
interest in the challenged speech is purely economic, that interest alone does 
not disqualify the speech for protection under traditional First Amendment 
174. See Kennedy, supra note 6, at 985; see also Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. 
Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759, 764 (M.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 634 F. 2d 127 (3d Cir. 
1980). 
175. See Hurwitz, supra note 4, at 124. 
176. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. 
177. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34. For a general discussion of the economic 
indicia of an anticompetitive boycott see Hurwitz, supra note 4, at 124. 
178. See supra text accompanying notes 124-27. 
179. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71. 
180. See supra text accompanying notes 130-31. 
181. 
It is neither unusual nor illegal for people to seek action on laws in the hope that 
they may bring about an advantage to themselves and a disadvantage to their 
competitors .... Indeed, it is quite probably people with just such a hope of 
personal advantage who provide much of the information upon which 
governments must act. A construction of the Sherman Act that would disqualify 
people from taking a public position on matters in which they are financially 
interested would thus deprive the government of a valuable source of information 
and ... deprive the people of their right to petition in the very instances in which 
that right may be of the most importance to them. 
Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139 (1961). 
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doctrine because the commercial nature of the speech does not negate its 
value in the marketplace of ideas.l82 While such speech qualifies for protec-
tion, in the hierarchy of First Amendment protection of expression, "purely 
commercial" speech bas long been afforded a more limited measure of pro-
tection "commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First 
Amendment values."183 A commercial expression bas been held to be within 
the parameters of First Amendment protection if it concerns lawful activity 
and is not misleading.l84 To be valid the asserted governmental interest in 
regulating such speech must be substantial, the regulation must directly 
advance the asserted governmental interest, and the regulation must be no 
more restrictive than necessary to serve that interest.l85 Although in regulat-
ing commercial speech the government need not employ the least restrictive 
means available, the alternative it chooses must be narrowly tailored to 
achieve its desired end.186 Further, it may not be presumed that speech is 
necessarily commercial whenever it relates to the speaker's financial motiva-
tion for speaking.187 
182. "[W)e may assume that the [speaker's] interest is a purely economic one. That hardly 
disqualifies him from protection under the First Amendment." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (defining commercial 
speech as that speech which proposes a commercial transaction; holding invalid as an 
abridgement of First Amendment rights a state statute that made advertising of prescription drug 
prices "unprofessional conduct," for which pharmacists would be subject to license revocation 
or suspension). The Court stated: 
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of 
our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic 
decisions. It is a matter of public interest that tliose decisions, in the aggregate, be 
intelligent and well informed. To this end, the fr;ee flow of commercial 
information is indispensable. 
Id. at 765 (citations omitted). See also Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989) 
("Some of our most valued forms of fully protected speech are uttered for a profit."); Bigelow v. 
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (holding unconstitutional under the First Amendment a Virginia 
statute that, at that time, made it illegal to encoumge or prompt, by sale or circulation of any 
publication, the procuring of an abortion). In Bigelow, the Court stated, "Advertising is not ... 
stripped of all First Amendment protection. The relationship of speech to the marketplace of 
products or of services does not make it valueless in the marl:etplace of ideas." I d. at 826. 
183. Ohmlik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,456 (1978) (upholding the indefinite 
suspension of an attorney for violating the anti-solicitation provisions of the Ohio Code of 
Professional Responsibility). In Ohralik, the Court stated: 
To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial 
speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the 
[First] Amendment's guarantee with respect to [noncommercial] speech. Rather 
than subject the First Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead have 
afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection. 
ld. See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748. 
184. See Centml Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980) (invalidating a regulation that, in an effort to conserve energy, prohibited 
promotional advertising by an electric utility except for advertisements encoumging shifts of 
consumption to off-peak demand time~). 
185. Id. 
186. "['l]he government goal [must] be substantial, and the cost [must] be carefully 
calculated. . . . ['I] he State bears the burden of justifying its restrictions ... so it must 
affmnatively establish the reasonable fit." .Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989). 
187. See Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781,795 (1988)("It is not clear 
that a [speaker's] speech is necessarily commercial whenever it relates to that person's financial 
motivation for speaking."). 
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When the Supreme Court has considered speech consisting of a combi-
nation of commercial and noncommercial elements, the Court has consistently 
treated the speech as political.IBB The motivation of the speaker has not been 
deemed relevant in the assessment of whether or not the speech is pro-
tected.I89 
A particular boycott may be neither purely commercial nor purely politi-
cal but driven by a mixture of motives. Mixed-motive boycotts, in effect, fall 
halfway between commercial and political speech. Attempts to adjudge the 
validity of First Amendment claims in such boycotts on the basis of an 
appraisal of the primacy of one motive over the other is not only pointless, but 
also inconsistent with established First Amendment jurisprudence ...yhen com-
binations of political and commercial speech are at issue. In deciding whether 
a boycott that combines protected and unprotected activity is persuasive or 
coercive, and thus whether or not it is entitled to First Amendment protection, 
a court should examine the expressive content and political context of the 
conduct rather than the motivation of the speaker.I90 
B. Why a "New" Approach? 
The Supreme Court's approach to resolving the question of the legality 
of concerted commercial activity undertaken for political ends has been 
essentially inconsistent. Since its decision in Eastern Railroad Presidents 
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,l9l the Court has revisited the question of 
the validity of such conduct four times.l92 In each decision, it resolved the 
issue via a different route. In each case, it avoided a thorough analysis of the 
combined political and commercial speech inherent in the conduct. 
In Noerr the Court, through its construction of the Sherman Act, 
avoided addressing head-on the clash between First Amendment values and 
antitrust policy. Observing that the legislative history of the Sherman Act 
contained no suggestion of an intent by Congress to regulate concerted politi-
cal activity, the Noerr Court determined that a more expansive construction of 
188. 
But even assuming ... that [the speech at issue] in the abstract is indeed merely 
"commercial," we do not believe that the speech retains its commercial character 
when it is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech. Our 
lodestars in deciding what level of scrutiny to apply ... must be the nature of the 
speech taken as a whole .... 
Riley, 487 U.S. at 796 (emphasis added). See also Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 
444 U.S. 620 (1980). In Schaumburg, the Court invalidated a local ordinance requiring 
charitable solicitors to use for charitable purposes (defined to exclude administrative expenses 
and costs), 75% of the funds solicited. ld. at 622. The Court held that charitable solicitations 
"involve a variety of speech interests ... that are within the protection of the First Amendment" 
and therefore such solicitations have not been treated as "purely commercial speech." I d. at 632. 
189. See, e.g., Riley, 487 U.S. at 795. Cf. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 
(1975). 
190. See Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226, 254 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (Silberman, J., concurring). 
191. 365 u.s. 127 (1961). 
192. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); International 
Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982); NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 
411 (1990). 
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the Act would infringe upon the First Amendment right to petition.193 The 
Court considered determination of the legislative intent of the Sherman Act to 
be the threshold question in assessing the legality of the activity. It avoided an 
analysis of the conduct under the First Amendment as a combination of politi-
cal and commercial speech. 
Four years later, when the Court decided United Mine Workers v. 
Pennington,t94 it applied the reasoning of Noerr. It concluded that regardless of 
any anticompetitive purpose underlying the agreement between the employers 
and the union, the conduct was shielded from antitrust illegality because it was 
an effort to influence public officials and the Sherman Act was not intended to 
reach such conduct.I95 Once again, the Court averted the need for a First 
Amendment analysis. 
The Court's interpretation of the statute in such a way as to circumvent 
the First Amendment issues implicated by the conduct was consistent with a 
longstanding rule of statutory construction.I96 Nevertheless, the Court's 
determination of the legality of the conduct in Noerr and United Mine 
Workers, resting as it did on a statutory construction of the Sherman Act, was 
an analytic red herring. The decision ultimately obfuscated the genuine issue in 
the cases and offered little guidance to future courts attempting to resolve the 
substantive conflict between First Amendment and antitrust jurisprudence in 
cases in which the conduct at issue involves both political and economic 
activity. 
Almost twenty years later in International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. 
Allied International, Inc.,t97 the Court considered the boycott by an American 
longshoremen's union of goods and cargoes from the Soviet Union in protest 
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While the Court acknowledged the 
purely political motivation of the participants, it held the conduct to be an 
illegal secondary boycott under the Labor Management Relations Act198 and 
chose not to consider at all the potential infringement of the boycotters' First 
Amendment rights, yet again eschewing a First Amendment analysis)99 
Following on the heels of International Longshoremen, the Court 
decided the Claiborne Hardware case. In Claiborne, the Court found the 
peaceful activities of the boycott of white merchants by the black citizens of 
193. 365 U.S. at 137-38. 
194. 381 u.s. 657 (1965). 
195. I d. at 669-70. 
196. "[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious 
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such 
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf 
Coast Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 
440 U.S. 490, 499-501, 504 (1979)). See also Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). The underlying presumption reflected in this rule is that Congress, like 
the courts, is bound to uphold the Constitution and would not lightly infringe constitutional 
rights; therefore, courts ought not needlessly confront constitutional issues and should employ 
every reasonable construction to save a statute from unconstitutionality. See generally Grenada 
Supervisors v. Brogden, 112 U.S. 261 (1884). 
197. 456 u.s. 212 (1982). 
198. 29 u.s.c. § 158(b)(4) (1988). 
199. International Longshoremen, 456 U.S. at 222-26. 
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Port Gibson, Mississippi entitled to First Amendment protection.200 Using the 
First Amendment protection afforded the peaceful aspects of the boycott as a 
backdrop for its examination of the illegal violent activities, the Court extended 
an aura of constitutionality to the overall boycott.20I The Court categorized the 
Claiborne Hardware boycott as political rather than economic and thus not 
subject to governmental regulation.202 Having pronounced the boycott political, 
the Court then merely applied the Noerr doctrine, likening the Claiborne boy-
cott to the direct political petitioning at issue in Noerr. It made no effort to bal-
ance the competing First Amendment and economic interests extant in the 
boycott. 
Finally, in SCTLA the Court was once again faced with deciding the 
legality of a boycott that operated on both a political and economic level. Here, 
it declared the boycott economic on the basis of what it perceived to be the 
primary motive of the boycotters, the desire to gain economic advantage for 
themselves.203 It concluded that the boycotters' purpose was alone sufficient 
to render the boycott nonexpressive, and made no effort to balance the com-
peting political and commercial speech elements of the conduct.204 
When faced with the task of deciding a case of concerted commercial 
activity undertaken for political ends, the Court has employed a variety of 
devices. These devices have permitted it to resolve the particular case, yet 
avoid a definitive First Amendment analysis of the combined speech and non-
speech aspects of the conduct. It has failed to strike a balance between First 
200. 
The boycott ... took many forms .... [It] was launched at a meeting ... of the 
NAACP .... Its acknowledged purpose was to secure compliance by both civic 
and business leaders with a lengthy list of demands for equality and racial justice. 
The boycott was supported by speeches and nonviolent picketing. Participants ... 
encouraged others to join .... Each of these elements of the boycott is a form of 
speech or conduct that is ordinarily entitled to protection under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907 (1982). In considering the significance 
of Claiborne Hardware in First Amendment jurisprudence, it should be noted that the white 
merchants never argued at any level of the case that a nonviolent organized political protest 
boycott could create tort or antitrust liability for its organizers. As a result, the Claiborne 
Hardware decision was concerned primarily with the sufficiency of the evidence that tied the 
boycott organizers to the unquestionably illegal incidents of violence that occurred tangentially 
with the boycott. See Covington, supra note 147, at 403. 
201. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 907-10 (the Court finding the lower court's 
holding to have been inadequately supported by the evidence). See also Covington, supra note 
147, at403. 
202. 
[1]he boycott clearly involved constitutionally protected activity. The established 
elements of speech, assembly, association, and petition, 'though not identical, are 
inseparable' .... Through exercise of these First Amendment rights, [the 
Claiborne Hardware boycotters] sought to bring about political, social, and 
economic change. Through speech, assembly, arid petition-rather than through 
. riot or revolution-[the boycotters] sought to change a social order that had 
consistently treated them as second-class citizens. 
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 911-12 (citations omitted). See also Covington, supra note 
147, at 403 ("[The Court] determined, by labeling rather than analyzing, that the boycott was 
political, rather than economic, activity and thus not readily subject to governmental 
regulation."). 
203. FfC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,427 (1990). 
204. !d. at 428-31. 
1992] MIXED-MOTIVE BOYCOTTS 741 
Amendment values and competition policy that will bring mixed-motive boy-
cott cases in line with the tenets of First Amendment jurisprudence. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The underlying principles of the per se rule in antitrust law are in direct 
opposition to established First Amendment doctrine in the case of mixed-
motive boycotts. The Court's decision in FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers 
Association ignored this conflict and expanded per se antitrust doctrine to 
group boycotts that succeed by persuasion rather than coercion. In so doing, 
the Court implied that determinations as to the validity of claims of First 
Amendment protection for collective political action depend less upon the 
content and context of the action than upon the presence or absence of self-
interest on the part of the actors. Evaluating the legitimacy of First 
Amendment claims for collective action on the basis of an assessment of the 
motives of the claimants effectively limits an irreplaceable means of communi-
cation "essential to the poorly financed causes of little people."205 The nega-
tive implications of this decision are significant and far reaching. 
The collective generation of political pressure is the very essence of 
democratic politics.206 Just as contributions to political campaigns and cam-
paign expenditures are aspects of the right of individuals to pool their financial 
resources to effectively advocate their political goals,207 individuals who com-
bine their efforts in a group boycott for political purposes associate to advo-
cate common goals. To consider such boycotts as illegal under the Sherman 
Act merely because the boycott may economically benefit its participants is to 
restrict the ability of such persons to pool together in order to disseminate their 
message. Such an interpretation of the antitrust laws clearly implicates First 
Amendment rights of free expression and association)OS 
The Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers 
Association is irreconcilable with First Amendment doctrine and values. It 
muddles the already confusing jurisprudence pertaining to protest boycotts. Its 
205. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (holding invalid as an 
unconstitutional invasion of freedom of speech and press an ordinance banning door-to-door 
solicitation and distribution of religious literature). See also SCTIA, 493 U.S. at 450 (Brennan, 
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
206. Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981). In Citizens 
Against Rent Control, a municipal ordinance placing a $250 ceiling on contributions to 
committees formed to support or oppose ballot measures was held violative of First Amendment 
rights of association and speech. "[The value of collective action] is that by collective effort 
individuals can make their views known, when, individually, their v~ices would be faint or 
lost." ld. at 294. 
207. "[T]he use of [corporate] funds to support a political candidate is 'speech'; 
independent campaign expenditures constitute 'political expression at the core of our electoral 
process and of the First Amendment freedoms."' Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 
494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 39 (1976)) (federal statute 
limiting to $1000 political contributions by individuals or groups to any single candidate for 
federal elective office held to violate First Amendment speech and association rights and Fifth 
Amendment equal protections rights). In Austin, the Supreme Court upheld a state statute 
prohibiting corporations from using corporate treasury funds for independent expenditures in 
support of or in opposition to candidates in elections for state office. 
208. See Meisel, supra note 129, at 1339. See also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 
458 U.S. 886, 911 (1982) ("The established elements of speech, assembly, association and 
petition, 'though not identical, are inseparable."'). 
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approach offers little direction to courts dealing with similar cases in the future 
and should be abandoned in favor of a new strategy. 
